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1 Introduction
It is widely believed that some form of international policy coordination is necessary to tackle
global environmental problems such as global warming.1 Economists have long argued that when
each country non-cooperatively sets the domestic environmental regulations, outcomes may be
inefficient because of externalities through transboundary pollution and/or imperfectly competi-
tive international markets (Barrett 1994; Kennedy 1994). Thus economists emphasize the need
for cooperative policies such as international environmental agreements (IEA) to internalize the
externalities and to achieve the efficient outcome.
Economists also recognize that promoting development of cleaner technologies is important
for overcoming environmental problems:2 they have focused attention on incentives of firms in
developing cleaner technologies and analyzed the effectiveness of different policy instruments
in inducing environmental innovation (Downing and White 1986; Milliman and Primce 1989;
Fischer et al. 2003). Most previous studies show that incentive-based environmental policies are
superior to command-and-control policies towards fostering innovation for developing cleaner
technologies.
However, to the best of author’s knowledge, there is no study investigating the relationship
between different environmental policies with and without the cooperation of governments and
firm incentives in developing cleaner technologies in open-economy settings. This relationship
is important because international firms that invest strategically in environmental R&D make
decisions according to, whether national governments determine policies cooperatively or non-
cooperatively and according to what policy instruments each government chooses. Thus, previous
studies leave important issues unanswered: What policy instruments (price or quantity regulation)
in international environmental agreements most encourage signatories’ innovation in cleaner tech-
nologies? Are firms’ strategic incentives for environmental R&D either excessive or insufficient
from the viewpoint of each country’s welfare? How would policy cooperation among countries
affect firms’ incentives to innovate?
To address these issues, we construct a simple two-country model of international oligopoly
and transboundary pollution and investigate and compare firms’ strategic incentives for developing
cleaner technology under four international policy regimes: (i) each country non-cooperatively (or
unilaterally) sets the level of tax regulations on its domestic polluting firm, (ii) each country non-
cooperatively sets the level of quantity regulations (iii) countries cooperatively set the level of a
harmonized tax, and (iv) countries cooperatively set the level of harmonized quantity regulations.
In our model, the governments are assumed to be unable to credibly commit to the level of envi-
ronmental regulations. This lack of regulatory commitment gives incentives to firms to influence
the level of regulations through their environmental R&D activities.
Within the above framework, we first investigate whether firm incentives are excessive or
1For this point, Stern Review (Stern (2007)) indicates that “stronger, more coordinated action is required to stabilise
concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere.”
2For example, Kneese and Schultze (1975) argued that “over the long haul, perhaps the most important single crite-
rion on which to judge environmental policies is the extent they spur new technology towards the efficient conservation
of environmental quality.”
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insufficient from the perspective of domestic welfare. The lack of regulatory commitment induces
firms to strategically over- or under-invest in any regime because the innovation affects the do-
mestic and foreign regulations, depending on the magnitude of marginal environmental damages
and the degree of emission spillovers. We show that if the marginal environmental damages are
large, the firm incentives are insufficient under non-cooperative tax regulations but are excessive
under non-cooperative and cooperative quantity regulations.
Second, we compare firm incentives under different policy regimes. We show that, in either
case, with or without policy cooperation, firm incentives under quantity regulations are greater
than those under price regulations if the marginal damages are greater. This result is important
because previous studies using a closed-economy model conclude that incentive-based regula-
tions are superior to command-and-control regulations for inducing the firms to invest in clean
technology.
Finally, we compare firm incentives with and without cooperation between governments.
Although stringent regulation under policy cooperation (harmonization) increases the value of and
need for innovation, firms do not necessarily have greater incentives under cooperative regimes
than non-cooperative regimes. This is because under non-cooperative policy regimes, firms also
have strategic incentives to relax domestic regulations and to tighten foreign regulations when
investing in environmental R&D. In contrast, if the policy is set cooperatively and harmonized
between nations, such strategic aspects of innovations are absent. Whether the policy instrument
is price or quantity regulations, our results demonstrate that firm incentives are greater under non-
cooperative regimes than under cooperative regimes if the marginal damages are large.
As mentioned above, firms have strategic incentives to change their environmental investment
in order to affect future regulations if the governments cannot commit themselves to environmen-
tal policies. The lack of regulatory commitment is a key assumption in our study, and we believe
it is justified by numerous examples of firms acting in this manner.3 For example, DuPont’s suc-
cessful R&D efforts to find substitutes for chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) changed the stringency of
Montreal Protocol.4 Another example of firms making strategic investment choices (or volun-
tary approaches) is the Keidanren Voluntary Action Plan on the Environment (Keidanren 1997)
to promote efforts to curb CO2 emissions, which is a unilateral initiative of Japan’s most influen-
tial business association. It was established even before the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol’s in
1997. Furthermore, the target the Japanese government accepted under the Kyoto Protocol was
partly based on consultations with Keidanren. Other examples include actions by German industry
groups when a coalition of Social Democrats and the Green Party proposed an energy tax in 1999
(Conrad 2001). These examples show how firms recognize a strategic incentive to act in ways that
3Kolstad (2000, p.211) indicates that “[c]ertainly, it seems reasonable to argue that levels of R&D investments are
more difficult to change than taxes and so these are set in the first stage because environmental regulators are rarely
willing and able to commit.” Tarui and Polasky (2005) indicate that large firms (e.g., large automobile companies,
electric power generators, or oil companies) who producing a significant share of emissions may have an incentive
to alter investment strategically in order to induce favorable shifts in future environmental policy. See Requate and
Unold (2003) and Requate (2005a) for the comparison of innovation incentives under different timing and commitment
regimes of environmental policies in a closed-economy model. In addition, the lack of credibility in environmental
policy makings also appears in Conrad (2001), Glazer and Janeba (2004), Poyago-Theotoky (2007), and Puller (2006).
4See Tarui and Polasky (2005) and Puller (2006) on this point.
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might influence future regulation.
This paper relates to the literature on the effects of different environmental policies on tech-
nological innovation in a closed economy setting (Downing and White 1986; Milliman and Prince
1989; Denicolo 1999; Fischer et al. 2003). Previous studies generally show that incentive-based
environmental policies are more likely to foster cost-effective technology innovation and diffu-
sion, than policies based on command-and-control approaches.5 Those studies and ours differ in
that they use a single-government model with perfectly competitive firms producing dirty goods,
whereas we use a two-country model with international oligopoly.6
This paper also relates to the literature on the strategic environmental policy in an open-
economy model (Conrad 1993; Barrett 1994; Kennedy 1994; Ulph 1996), which closely follows
the strategic trade literature pioneered by Brander and Spencer (1985). Dealing with issues of
strategic trade in the output market and transboundary pollution, they demonstrate considerable
strategic relationships among governments for environmental policymaking, and government in-
centives to impose inefficiently less (or more) stringent environmental regulations.7 Since they
focus on strategic interactions between governments, they do not investigate firms’ incentives for
environmental R&D. The paper most related to ours is Conrad (2001), which considers policy
regimes with different timings of environmental policymaking (setting taxes and standards) in the
model of strategic environmental policy. He shows that if the industry anticipates that taxes and
fees will be introduced in upcoming years, it seems rational to act in advance in order to mitigate
the necessity for taxes. While his study focuses on investigating firms’ strategic incentives to ad-
just output and abatement before regulations are introduced, ours investigates and compares the
strategic R&D incentives of firms under several policy regimes.8
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Section 2 we present the elements of the model.
In Section 3 we analyze firm incentives for environmental R&D under non-cooperative tax and
quantity regulations, and then we compare them. In Section 4 we analyze the same under cooper-
ative policy regimes. In section 5 we analyze the effect of policy cooperation on firms’ innovation
incentives. Section 6 offers concluding remarks.
5For a detailed survey of the influence of different environmental policies on innovation and diffusion, see Jaffe et
al. (2002) and Requate (2005b).
6Some studies compare R&D incentives in a single-government model with an imperfectly competitive market
(Montero 2002; Glazer and Janeba 2004; Puller 2006; Poyago-Theotoky 2007). Glazer and Janeba (2004) show that
if the government is unable to commit the level of regulations, the firm has an incentive to overinvest in reducing
emissions under price regulation, but an incentive to underinvest under quantity regulation.
7For general discussion and analysis of this subject, see also Rauscher (1997).
8Recently, Ulph and Ulph (2007) investigate environmental R&D of international oligopolistic firms in the model
of strategic environmental policymaking. They consider the case where governments have two policy instruments (an
emissions tax and an R&D subsidy) and can commit to the policies before firms choose their R&D investment. Our
study differs from theirs in that we explicitly compare the firm incentives under price and quantity regulations with and
without policy cooperation between governments. In addition, we consider the case where governments are unable to
commit to the regulation level credibly.
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2 The Model
Consider two exporting firms 1 and 2 located in two different countries 1 and 2, respectively. Each
firm i 2 f1;2g produces homogenous goods and engages in Cournot (quantity) competition in a
world market. In the production process, firms generate emissions that are proportional to output.
Firm i’s emissions harm, not only country i’s welfare, but also country j’s welfare partly, i.e., its
emissions are transboundary. In order to reduce emissions, regulation policies are implemented.
We examine four regimes with respect to policymaking in two countries: (i) regime NT refers
to the non-cooperative tax regulation where each government non-cooperatively sets domestic
emission tax rates; (ii) regime NQ refers to the non-cooperative quantity regulation where each
government non-cooperatively sets the level of domestic emissions; (iii) regime CT refers to the
cooperative tax regulation where governments set cooperative(harmonized) tax rates; (iv) regime
CQ refers to cooperative quantity regulation where governments set cooperative (harmonized)
level of emissions.
The timing of the game is as follows. In period 1, each government sets a policy: under
NT (NQ), it sets a domestic tax (the level of domestic emissions) non-cooperatively; under CT
(CQ), it sets a harmonized tax (the harmonized level of emissions) cooperatively. In period 2,
given the regulation policies, each firm non-cooperatively decides outputs. We investigate the firm
incentives for environmental R&D that are evaluated in period 0, i.e., R&D incentives that we
examine have strategic natures because they take into account the effect of own environmental
R&D on the domestic and foreign policies or cooperative policy as well as on own and rival
firm’s behavior. The assumption that R&D decisions are made before regulators set policies is
particularly valid when R&D is typically a long-term activity and a government or regulator is
unable to commit to the level of environmental policy credibly.9
We define firm incentives for environmental R&D (in period 0) as the marginal profit of an
improvement in the firm’s emission technologies. In other words, the firm incentives are equiv-
alent to its willingness to pay for a marginal improvement in emission technologies.10 Through-
out the analysis, we also define and investigate government incentives to promote environmental
R&D. Although R&D efforts are undertaken by firms, it is significant to consider the government
incentives and to compare them with firm incentives, as described later.
2.1 The Firms
In period 2, firms 1 and 2 engage in Cournot competition in a world market. The emissions by
firm i is ai = eiyi, where ei is the emission coefficient and yi is the output of firm i. Profits of firm
9Notice that the governments are assumed to be unable to commit to the level of the policy, but to be able to commit
to the type of the policy and the presence or absence of policy cooperation between governments.
10It seems that the definition of firm incentives would be too simplified, but in fact, this simplification enables us to
clearly compare the firm incentives under different policy regimes without numerical simulations.
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i (i= f1;2g, i 6= j) are defined by
pi =
8>>>>>><>>>>>>:
p(yi+ y j)yi  ti ei yi under regime NT
p
ai
ei
+
a j
e j
ai
ei
under regime NQ
p(yi+ y j)yi  t¯ ei yi under regime CT
p
 a¯
ei
+
a¯
e j
 a¯
ei
under regime CQ
(1)
where p() is the inverse demand of goods in a world market, ti and ai are the emission tax rate
and the level of emissions in country i that are non-cooperatively set by government i, and t¯ and
a¯ are harmonized policies that cooperatively set by both governments. For simplicity, we assume
that marginal production costs of both firms are zero.11 The inverse demand function is assumed
to be p(y1+ y2) = 1  y1  y2. Each firm’s incentives for environmental R&D denoted by FIi are
evaluated by the value of  ¶pi=¶ei in period 0, i.e., the marginal profit of a decrease in emission
coefficient.
2.2 The Governments
Welfare of country i (i = f1;2g, i 6= j) is defined by the sum of the profits of the domestic firm,
the tax revenues (if any), and the environmental damages from emissions:
Wi =
8>>><>>>:
pi+ tieiyi di(ei yi+ g e j y j) under regime NT;
pi di(ai+ g a j) under regime NQ;
pi+ t¯eiyi di(ei yi+ g e j y j) under regime CT;
pi di(a¯+ g a¯) under regime CQ;
(2)
where di is the constant marginal environmental damage (MED) from emissions and g 2 [0;1] is
the degree of emission spillovers. Domestic consumption in each country is sufficiently small in
comparison with world consumption, so that each government ignores the effect of its policies on
domestic consumers, and any tax payment is purely distributional. Incentives for environmental
R&D of government i (GIi) are evaluated by the value of  ¶Wi=¶ei in period 0, i.e., the marginal
welfare gain of a decrease in emission coefficient of firm i.
It is important to derive government incentives and to compare them with firm incentives.
Suppose temporarily that firm i’s investment costs for attaining a marginal improvement in emis-
sion technologies are Di as a whole. If FIi >GIi and FIi > Di >GIi hold in equilibrium, then firm
i undertakes the investment that reduces the domestic welfare. Thus, if FIi > GIi holds in equi-
librium, we say firm incentives are excessive. On the other hand, if FIi < GIi and FIi < Di < GIi
hold in equilibrium, then firm i does not invest while the investment, if done, increases the do-
mestic welfare. Thus, if FIi < GIi holds in equilibrium, then the firm incentives are said to be
insufficient. In both cases, the firm does not have right incentives for environmental R&D, and
thus government intervention in R&D may be justified.
11The results obtained in this paper are also qualitatively valid for constant marginal cost of production.
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3 Under Non-cooperative Policy Regimes
3.1 Emission Taxes (Regime NT)
The model is solved backwards. In period 2, firm imaximizes (1) taking y j, ti, and t j as given. The
first-order conditions of the problem are yi = (1 eiti y j)=2 for i 6= j, which is the best-response
function of firm i. Then the equilibrium output in period 2 is yi = (1 2eiti+ e jt j)=3.
In period 1, each country non-cooperatively chooses the emission tax rate so as to maximize
the domestic welfare (2). The first-order conditions of the problem are ti = (6eidi 3ge jdi e jt j 
1)=4ei for i= 1;2 i 6= j. We obtain the equilibrium tax in period 1 as follows:
tNTi =
ei(8di+ gd j) 2e j(d j+2gdi) 1
5ei
8i= 1;2; (3)
where superscript NT represents the variable in the equilibrium of regime NT.12 The effects of
the marginal improvements (marginal decreases) in emission technology on the own and other’s
equilibrium tax rates are obtained by
 ¶ t
NT
i
¶ei
= 1+2e j(d j+2gdi)
5e2i
< 0;  ¶ t
NT
j
¶ei
=
2(di+2gd j)
5e j
> 0: (4)
Lemma 1
A marginal innovation in domestic firm lowers the domestic tax and raises the foreign tax rate.
Substituting (3) into the equilibrium output in period 2 and evaluating it at symmetric equilib-
rium, we obtain the equilibrium outputs of each firm as yNT = f2 ed(2  g)g=5, where variables
without subscript indicate those in symmetric equilibrium. Thus, we need to assume d < 2(2 g)e
for ensuring yNT > 0 in equilibrium.
Assumption NT: d < 2(2 g)e holds in NT equilibrium.
Next we investigate firm i’s incentives for environmental R&D. The firm incentives are de-
fined as the marginal profits of improvement in its own emission technologies, that is, FINTi 
 ¶pNTi =¶ei. Deriving FINTi and then evaluating it at a symmetric equilibrium, we have
FINT =
4d(3+ g)

2  ed(2  g)	
25
> 0; (5)
which indicates that each firm’s innovation incentive is always positive and is increasing in g .13
Government i’s incentives are defined as the marginal welfare gain of the improvement in emis-
sion technologies of domestic firm, that is, GINTi   ¶WNTi =¶ei. Evaluating it at a symmetric
equilibrium, we have
GINT =
d

4(3+ g)+ ed(4+3g)(4g 3)	
25
> 0; (6)
12We allow for the possibility of tNT < 0 in equilibrium. In other words, each government may have incentives for
subsidizing the domestic emissions (or exports).
13The sign condition can be obtained by using Assumption NT.
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Figure 1: Firm and government incentives under regimes NT (left) and NQ (right).
which is also positive and increasing in g .
Note that from (4) we find that innovations relax (tighten) the domestic (foreign) tax more
when the value of g becomes larger. Thus, both FINT and GINT are increasing in g .
Comparing (5) and (6), we obtain the following proposition.
Proposition 1
Under regime NT, firm incentives for environmental R&D are insufficient (excessive) if MED
and/or the emission spillovers are larger (smaller). Formally,
FINT Q GINT , d R 4(3+ g)
(12+3g+8g2)e
:
Proof: See Appendix.
The differences between FINT and GINT are the effects of innovations on environmental
damages and tax revenues. Domestic innovations increase (decrease) domestic emissions for large
(small) value of d, whereas they necessarily decrease foreign emissions.14 When d and g are
relatively small, the domestic innovations reduce tax revenues and the benefits from emission
reductions in domestic and foreign countries are small. Thus, FINT > GINT holds for smaller d
and g . When d and g are large, the domestic innovations increase tax revenues and the benefits
from emission reductions in foreign country become large.15 Thus, FINT <GINT holds for larger
d and g .
The left panel of Fig.1 illustrates the result in (g;d) plane. From Assumption NT, the region
above d = 2=f(2 g)eg curve is ruled out. The critical value of d shown in Proposition 1 separates
the remaining regions into FINT >GINT region and FINT <GINT region. In FINT >GINT region,
the private innovation incentives are excessive in the sense that the private gains from innovation
exceed the domestic welfare gains form innovation. Thus, in this case, the firm may undertake
14They can be confirmed by  ¶ (eiyNTi )=¶ei = f2  ed(8+ g)g=5 and  ¶ (e jyNTj )=¶ei = ed(4+3g)=5< 0.
15Notice that, when d is large, the domestic emissions are increased by innovations. However, the net domestic gains,
which are defined by (tNTi  di)eiyNTi , are increased by innovations for large d.
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welfare-reducing R&D. In FINT <GINT region, on the contrary, the private innovation incentives
are insufficient, and the firm may not undertake welfare-enhancing R&D.
3.2 Quantity Regulations (Regime NQ)
Next, consider non-cooperative regulation by quantity, which is defined as setting of the total
allowable volume of emissions ai by each government. Because e1, e2, a1, and a2 are determined
in period 0 and 1, we need not to consider the firms output choices in period 2 as long as the
quantity regulation is binding.
The welfare maximization problems of government i (i= 1;2) in period 1 is
max
ai
p
ai
ei
+
a j
e j
 ai
ei
 di(ai+ ga j):
Solving the first-order conditions of both governments, we obtain the equilibrium level of emis-
sions (quantity regulations) in country i as aNQi = ei(1  2eidi + e jd j)=3, where superscript NQ
represents the variable under NQ regime. Then we have
 ¶a
NQ
i
¶ei
= 1 4eidi+ e jd j
3
R 0;  ¶a
NQ
j
¶ei
= e jdi
3
< 0: (7)
Lemma 2
A marginal innovation in domestic firm relaxes or tightens the domestic quantity regulation and
tightens the foreign quantity regulation.
In contrast to the tax case, a marginal innovation tightens the domestic and foreign quantity
regulation when di is small. The intuition is as follows. When di is small, the regulator i sets a
larger domestic emission allowance. In this case, a marginal innovation greatly increases domestic
outputs, which makes the regulator strengthen the quantity regulation.16
Using the equilibrium level of emissions, we obtain the outputs of each firm in symmetric
equilibrium as yNQ = (1  ed)=3. Thus, we need to assume the following so that yNQ be positive.
Assumption NQ: d < 1e holds in NQ equilibrium.
We then derive the firm and government incentives for environmental R&D under NQ regime.
Deriving FINQi  ¶pNQi =¶ei and then evaluating it at a symmetric equilibrium, we have
FINQ =
d(1+5ed)
9
> 0; (8)
which is always positive although an innovation may tighten the domestic regulation (as shown
in Lemma 2). This is because the innovation necessarily tightens the foreign regulation, which
dominates the effect on domestic regulation.17
16Notice that as in a closed-economy model of Puller (2006), higher innovation causes the regulator to tighten the
regulation in the case of the uniform standard whereas it causes the regulator to decrease the tax in the case of an
emission tax. These properties are partly carried on into our open economy model.
17Since the equilibrium level of quantity regulation is independent of g , FINQ is also independent of g . Notice that
this is due to the linearity of environmental damage function we assume.
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The government incentives are also defined by GINQi   ¶WNQi =¶ei, and, in a symmetric
equilibrium, it can be obtained by
GINQ =
d

4+ ed(3g 4)	
9
> 0; (9)
which is always positive and increasing in g .
Comparing (8) and (9), we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2
Under regime NQ, firm incentives for environmental R&D are insufficient (excessive) if MED is
smaller (larger) and/or the emission spillovers are larger (smaller). Formally,
FINQ Q GINQ , d Q 1
(3  g)e
Proof: Immediate from (8) and (9).
In contrast to Proposition 1, the smaller the MED, the more likely firm incentives are smaller
than government incentives. This result is straightforward. The difference between FINQ and
GINQ is the effect of innovation on environmental damages. As shown in Lemma 2, when d is
small, innovations decrease both countries’ emissions. Thus, government incentives are larger
than firm incentives for smaller values of d. On the other hand, when d is large, innovations
increase net domestic emissions and therefore the reverse holds. The right panel of Fig.1 illustrates
the results.
3.3 Comparison between Regimes NT and NQ
Next we compare NT and NQ equilibrium in two points: welfare and innovation incentives of
firms. The welfare in each equilibrium can be obtained, respectively, by
WNT =
f2  ed(2  g)gf1  ed(1+7g)g
25
; WNQ =
(1  ed)f1  ed(1+3g)g
9
:
We then state:
Proposition 3
Welfare in each country is higher under regime NQ compared to regime NT. In addition, welfare
differentials become larger as emission spillovers become greater. Formally, WNQ >WNT and
d(WNQ WNT )=dg > 0.
Proof: The first assertion comes from WNQ WNT = 7f1  ed(1  3g)g2=225 > 0, while the
second one from d(WNQ WNT )=dg = 14edf1  ed(1 3g)g=75> 0.
The welfare advantage of regime NQ over regime NT can be confirmed by the fact that
equilibrium outputs under NQ are smaller than those under NT.18 Under NT, each government
cannot help setting lower tax rates out of fear that setting higher tax rates induces foreign firm
to produce more, while under NQ the foreign firm cannot change its output after the domestic
18In particular, we have yNT   yNQ = 1 ed(1 3g)15 > 0 with using Assumption NQ.
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Figure 2: Firm incentives for environmental R&D: Non-cooperative price vs. quantity Regulations
government sets policy. Thus, the noncooperative tax becomes inefficiently lower and the welfare
differentials become larger as damages from foreign emissions become larger (i.e. g is larger).19
We then compare the firm incentives under NT with those under NQ.
Proposition 4
Firm incentives for environmental R&D are larger under regime NT compared to regime NQ for
small MED and/or large emission spillovers, and vice versa. Formally,
FINT R FINQ , d Q 191+72gf341 36g(1+ g)ge :
Proof: From (5) and (8), we obtain the critical value of d displayed in the proposition. In addition,
it is obvious that the critical value is increasing in g .
Contrary to the widespread notion that incentive-based (price) regulations induce firms’ inno-
vation more than command-and-control (quantity) regulations, our result indicates that the relative
ranking of firm incentives crucially depends on d and g if we take into account an international
oligopoly and lack of commitment power of regulators. The underlying intuition is as follows:
When d is small, innovations tighten the domestic quantity regulation as well as the foreign quan-
tity regulation as Lemma 2 shows. On the other hand, innovations relax the domestic tax regulation
while tighten the foreign regulation. Thus, FINT > FINQ holds for smaller d. When d is large,
innovations relax the domestic regulation and tighten the foreign regulation under either regime.
However, the regulation is more strict under NQ than NT (equivalently, yNT > yNQ), the benefits
from increases in outputs are greater under NQ than NT. This is why FINT < FINQ holds for larger
d. In addition, from (4) and (7), the larger g , the greater an innovation decreases (increases) the
domestic (foreign) tax rates, while the effect of an innovation on the domestic and foreign quantity
regulations is independent of g . Thus, FINT > FINQ holds for larger value of g . Fig. 2 simply
illustrates the results.
19It can be confirmed by the fact that tNT is decreasing in g but aNQ is independent in g .
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4 Under Cooperative Policy Regimes
In this section, we examine the issue of international harmonization on pollution controls. Sup-
pose an official multilateral agreement, for example an international climate agreement, requires
a single and harmonization of environmental policies in each country, by which both countries
are encouraged to abide. The principle is that both governments set harmonized regulations to
maximize the sum of both countries’ welfare. Firm incentives for environmental R&D investi-
gated in this section are those in the case where firms expect such a policy harmonization to be
implemented.
4.1 Emission Taxes (Regime CT)
In period 2, each firm chooses outputs so as to maximize its profits (1), given the rival’s outputs and
harmonized tax rate t¯. Solving the first-order conditions of both firms characterizes the equilibrium
outputs: yi = f1  (2ei  e j)t¯g=3.
In period 1, the collective choice on harmonized tax rate is decided so as to maximize the sum
of both countries’ welfare. The maximization problem is represented by maxt¯ W1+W2. Arranging
the first-order condition of the problem, we obtain the equilibrium tax rate tCT as
tCT =
n 2
å
i
ei+
2
å
i 6= j
6e2i (di+ gd j) 3e1e2(d1+d2)(1+ g)
o.
f2(e1+ e2)2g;
where superscript CT represents the variable under regime CT.20 Differentiating tCT in  ei and
evaluating it at a symmetric equilibrium, we obtain
 ¶ t
CT
¶ei
=
1
8e2
> 0: (10)
Lemma 3
A marginal innovation in one firm necessarily raises the harmonized tax rate.
As before, we assume the (symmetric) equilibrium outputs yCT = f1  ed(1+ g)g=4 to be
positive:
Assumption CT: d < 1(1+g)e holds in CT equilibrium.
We next derive firm and government incentives for environmental R&D in period 0. The firm
incentive is defined by FICTi   ¶pCTi =¶ei as before. Evaluating at a symmetric equilibrium, it
leads to
FICT =
f1  ed(1+ g)gf1+4ed(1+ g)g
16e
> 0: (11)
Innovations raise the harmonized tax but lower the net marginal cost of own production
(eitCT ), and thus increase outputs and profits of the innovating firm.21 This is why FICT is always
20The second-order condition of the problem is  2(e1+ e2)2=9< 0.
21Actually, the effect of the domestic innovation on the domestic outputs is  ¶yCTi =¶ei = f1+4ed(1+ g)g=8e> 0,
which is evaluated at a symmetric equilibrium.
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positive. The government incentives defined by GICTi   ¶WCTi =¶ei, evaluating at a symmetric
equilibrium, lead to
GICT =
1+ ed(1+ g)f6+ ed( 7+9g)g
16e
> 0: (12)
Then we state:
Proposition 5
Under regime CT, firm incentives for environmental R&D are necessarily insufficient. In addi-
tion, the degree of insufficiency becomes larger as emission spillovers become greater. Formally,
FICT < GICT and d(GICT  FICT )=dg > 0.
Proof: From (11) and (12), we have GICT  FICT = d(1+g)f3 ed(3 13g)g=16> 0, where the
inequality comes from Assumption CT. In addition, the differentials are clearly increasing in g .
Intuition is as follows. The domestic innovation increases both the domestic tax revenues and
the environmental damages from the domestic pollution, but the net effect on domestic welfare is
positive.22 Thus, FICT < GICT holds even if g = 0. As a result, under the cooperative tax regime,
the private innovation incentives are necessarily insufficient for a domestic welfare point of view,
which is illustrated in the left panel of Fig.3.
4.2 Quantity Regulations (Regime CQ)
Next we derive the firm and government incentives for environmental R&D in the case where
harmonized quantity regulation (emission allowance) is cooperatively decided. As before, each
firm cannot produce outputs beyond the predetermined level a¯=ei = yi. Thus, we need not to
investigate the behavior of each firm in period 2 unless the quantity regulation is not binding.
The cooperative emission standard a¯ = eiyi is chosen in period 1 so as to maximize joint
welfareW1+W2. The maximization problem is
max
a¯
2
å
i 6= j
n
p
 a¯
ei
+
a¯
e j
 a¯
ei
 dia¯(1+ g)
o
:
The first-order condition, after some manipulation, is 23
a¯= e1e2
h 2
å
i 6= j
n
ei  eie jdi(1+ g)
oi
=f2(e1+ e2)2g:
Differentiating this with respect to  ei and evaluating it at a symmetric equilibrium, we have
  ¶ a¯
¶ei
= 1 2ed(1+ g)
8
R 0: (13)
22This can be confirmed by
 ¶f(t
CT  di)eiyCTi g
¶ei
=
df3+ g+3ed( 1+2g+3g2)g
16
> 0;
where the inequality comes from Assumption CT.
23The second-order condition is  f2(e1+ e2)2g=(e21+ e22)< 0.
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Figure 3: Firm and government incentives under regimes CT (left) and CQ (right).
Lemma 4
A marginal innovation in one firm tightens or relaxes the harmonized quantity regulation.
Notice also that (13) shows that when d is smaller (larger) than 1=f2(1+g)eg, then a marginal
innovation decreases (increases) a¯.
The next assumption ensures that the (symmetric) equilibrium outputs yCQ = f1  ed(1+
g)g=4 is positive:
Assumption CQ: d < 1(1+g)e holds in CQ equilibrium.
The firm incentives are defined by FICQi  ¶pCQi =¶ei. Deriving it and then evaluating it at
a symmetric equilibrium, we have
FICQ =
1+ e2d2(1+ g)2
16e
> 0: (14)
The government incentives are defined by GICQi  ¶WCQi =¶ei. At a symmetric equilibrium, we
have
GICQ =
f(1  ed(1+ g)gf1+3ed(1+ g)g
16e
> 0: (15)
Then we state:
Proposition 6
Under regime CQ, firm incentives for environmental R&D are insufficient (excessive) if MED
and/or the emission spillovers are smaller (larger). Formally,
FICQ R GICQ , d R 1
2(1+ g)e
Proof: Immediate from (14) and (15).
The result is straightforward: when the marginal innovation relaxes the quantity regulation
(i.e., it increases a¯), it increases the total emissions in one country as well. Thus, in this case,
the government incentives are smaller than the firm incentives. Actually, the critical value of d in
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Figure 4: Firm incentives for environmental R&D: Cooperative price vs. quantity regulations
Proposition 6 coincides with that for  ¶ a¯=¶ei = 0. The result is illustrated in the right panel of
Fig.3.
4.3 Comparing between Regimes CT and CQ
Let us now compare firm incentives in CT with those in CQ equilibrium. Obviously, the welfare
under CT and that under CQ are same because yCT = yCQ.24 In other words, if we do not consider
innovative activities of firms, the two regimes (CT and CQ) are indifferent. However, the firm
incentives for environmental R&D are different between under two regimes. Comparing (11) and
(14) yields the following result.
Proposition 7
Firm incentives for environmental R&D are larger under regime CT compared to regime CQ for
small MED and/or small emission spillovers, and vice versa. Formally,
FICT R FICQ , d Q 3
5(1+ g)e
(16)
Proof: Immediately from (11) and (14).
As under the non-cooperative policy regimes, the ranking with regard to firm incentives for
environmental R&D crucially depends on d and g . The underlying intuition is as follows. From
(10) and (13), we find that for larger value of d, innovations relax the harmonized level of quantity
regulations while they necessarily strengthen that of price (tax) regulations. Thus, FICT < FICQ
holds for larger value of d. On the other hand, when d is small, innovations tighten both cooper-
ative policies. However, under CT, innovations reduce the net marginal cost of production (eitCT )
and thus increase outputs of the innovating firm (see footnote 21). This is why FICT > FICQ holds
for smaller value of d. Fig. 4 simply illustrates the result.
24In detail, we haveWCT =WCS = f1  ed(1+ g)g2=8 in a symmetric equilibrium.
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Figure 5: Non-cooperative vs. cooperative Regulations: Tax regulation (left) and quantity regula-
tion (right)
5 Does Policy Cooperation Encourage Environmental Innovations?
In this section we compare firm incentives under non-cooperative policy regimes with those under
cooperative policy regimes. It is obvious that the level of regulations is more strict and the welfare
of both countries is greater under cooperative policies than under noncooperative policies (either
tax or quantity regulations). However, rankings of firm incentives for environmental R&D are not
easy to determine because more strict regulations under cooperative regimes increase the value
and need of innovation for firms, while they also eliminate the strategic advantages of innovation
of relaxing the domestic regulations and tightening the foreign regulations.
5.1 Non-cooperative vs. Cooperative Tax Regulations
The following proposition compares FINT with FICT .
Proposition 8
Firm incentives for environmental R&D are larger under regime NT compared to regime CT for
large MED and/or large emission spillovers, and vice versa. Formally,
FINT R FICT , d RY 50n
309+53g+
q
(259)2+3g(19718+6403g)
o
e
;
where 0<Y< 1=f(1+ g)eg holds for all g 2 [0;1].
Proof: See Appendix.
As shown by the left panel of Fig. 5, firm incentives are larger under NT than under CT
except when d is extremely small. Innovations under NT have the effect of lowering domestic
taxes and raising foreign taxes, whereas those under CT have the effect of raising both countries’
tax. Because of this strategic effect of innovation that widens the gap between domestic and
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foreign tax rates under NT, FINT > FICT holds in most regions. However, as we see from (5)
and (11), FINT converges to zero but FICT converges to 1=(16e) as d approaches to zero.25 Thus,
FINT < FICT holds for extremely small d.
5.2 Quantity Regulation
Finally, we compare firm incentives under NQ with CQ.
Proposition 9
Firm incentives for environmental R&D are larger under regime NQ compared to regime CQ for
large MED and/or small emission spillovers, and vice versa. Formally,
FINQ R FICQ , d RW
p
(19 9g)(37+9g) 8
e(71 9g(2+ g)) ;
where 0<W< 1=f(1+ g)eg holds for all g 2 [0;1].
Proof: See Appendix.
The right panel of Fig. 5 illustrates the results. When d is large, innovations relax the do-
mestic regulations and tighten the foreign regulations under NQ, while they relax both countries’
regulations under CQ. Thus, FINQ > FICQ holds for relatively large d. On the other hand, when
d is small, under both regimes, innovations tighten both countries’ regulations. In this case, the
level of regulations is more strict under CQ than under NQ, which means that a marginal profits
of innovations are larger under CQ than under NQ. Thus, FINQ < FICQ holds for relatively small
d.
6 Concluding Remarks
Employing a simple two-country model of strategic environmental policy, we investigate and
compare firm incentives for developing cleaner technology under several policy regimes: Non-
cooperative policy settings of tax and quantity regulations (NT and NQ) and cooperative policy
settings of tax and quantity regulations (CT and CQ).
The results obtained in this paper are summarized as follows: First, under any regime, firm
incentives are either excessive or insufficient from a welfare point of view, depending on the
marginal environmental damages and the degree of emission spillovers. This may provide ratio-
nales for government intervention in environmental R&D. Second, contrary to the general view,
firm incentives are not necessarily greater under price regulations than under quantity regulations.
Under both non-cooperative and cooperative regimes, firm incentives under quantity regulations
are greater than those under price regulations if the environmental damages are large. This finding
may be significant for designing international environmental agreements. Finally, under either
regime of tax and quantity regulations, policy cooperation (harmonization) necessarily enhances
25This is because the equilibrium tax rate under NT becomes negative for extremely small d whereas that under CT
are always positive.
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welfare in each country, but does not necessarily increase firms’ innovation incentives. In partic-
ular, if environmental damages are large, policy cooperation lowers firms’ innovation incentives.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: By (5) and (6), we have
FINT  GINT = df4(3+ g)  ed(12+3g+8g
2)g
25
:
Thus, we have FINT Q GTNT , d R 4(3+g)(12+3g+8g2)e : Differentiating of this critical value of d with
respect to g yields
d

4(3+g)
(12+3g+8g2)e

dg
=
4(3 48g 8g2)
e(12+3g+8g2)
R 0 , g Q 0:062;
which implies that except for the case where emission spillovers are extremely small, the critical
value of d becomes smaller as g becomes larger. Thus, FINT < GINT is more likely to hold when
g becomes large.
Proof of Proposition 8: From (5) and (11), we have
FINT  FICT = hd2+kd+m; (A.1)
where
h =
( 71+66g+41g2)e
100
R 0 , g R gˆ  20
p
10 33
41
 0:738;
k =
309+53g
400
> 0; m =   1
16e
< 0:
In the case of g  gˆ (i.e. h  0), the condition for (A.1)> 0 is d < dS or d > dL, where dS and dL
are the smaller and the larger solution for (A.1)= 0. dS and dL are derived as follows:
dS =
50
e(309+53g 
p
(259)2+3g(19718+6403g)
;
dL =
50
e(309+53g+
p
(259)2+3g(19718+6403g)
;
where dS < 0< dL < 1=e holds for g > gˆ . Thus, in the case of g > gˆ , d > dL ensures (A.1)> 0.
In the case of g < gˆ (i.e. h < 0), the condition for (A.1)> 0 is d0S < d < d0L, where d0S and d0L
are the smaller and the larger solution for (A.1)= 0.
d0S =
50
e(309+53g+
p
(259)2+3g(19718+6403g)
;
d0L =
50
e(309+53g 
p
(259)2+3g(19718+6403g)
;
where 0 < d0S < 1=e < d
0
L holds for g < gˆ . From Assumption CT, we exclude 1=e < d. Thus, in
the case of g < gˆ , d > d0S ensures (A.1)> 0. The fact dL = d0S Y proves FINT R FICT , d RY.
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From the fact that Y is strictly decreasing in g , we can prove that FINT > FICT is more likely to
hold as g becomes large.
Proof of Proposition 9: We obtain
FINQ FICQ = nd2+xd+v ; (A.2)
where
n =
f71 9g(2+ g)ge
144
> 0; x =
1
9
> 0; v =   1
16e
< 0:
Thus, the condition for (A.2)> 0 is d < d00S or d > d
00
L , where d
00
S and d
00
L are the smaller and the
larger solutions for (A:2) = 0.
d00S = 
8+
p
(19 9g)(37+9g)
e(71 9g(2+ g)) < 0; d
00
L =
p
(19 9g)(37+9g) 8
e(71 9g(2+ g)) > 0;
where 0 < d00L  W < 1=f(1+ g)eg for all g 2 [0;1]. Thus, we have FINQ R FICQ , d R W.
Differentiating W in g yields
dW
dg
=
729(1+ g)
eD(8+D)2
> 0;
where D p(19 9g)(37+9g) > 0. Thus, we can prove that FINQ > FICQ is more likely to
hold as g becomes small.
References
Barrett, S. (1994). Strategic environmental policy and international trade. Journal of Public Eco-
nomics, 54, 325-338.
Brander, J.A., & Spencer, B.J. (1985). Export subsidies and international market share rivalry.
Journal of International Economics, 18, 83-100.
Conrad, K. (1993). Taxes and subsidies for pollution-intensive industries as trade policy. Journal
of Environmental Economics and Management, 25, 121-135.
Conrad, K. (2001). Voluntary environmental agreement vs. emission taxes in strategic trade model.
Environmental and Resource Economics, 19, 361-381.
Denicolo`, V. (1999). Pollution-reducing innovations under taxes or permits. Oxford Economic
Papers, 51, 184-199.
Downing, P.B., & White, L.J. (1986). Innovation in pollution control. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 13, 18-29.
Fischer, C., Parry, I.W.H., & Pizer, W.A. (2003). Instrument choice for environmental protec-
tion when technological innovation is endogenous. Journal of Environmental Economics and
Management, 45, 523-545.
19
Glazer, A., & Janeba, E. (2004). Strategic investment by a regulated firm. International Tax and
Public Finance, 11, 123-132.
Jaffe, A.B., Newell, R.G., & Stavins, R.N. (2002). Environmental policy and technological
change. Environmental and Resource Economics, 22, 41-69.
Keidanren (1997). Keidanren voluntary action plan on the environment.
http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/pol058/intro.html. Accessed 22 October 2009.
Kennedy, P.W. (1994). Equilibrium pollution taxes in open economies with imperfect competition.
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 27, 49-63.
Kneese, A., & Schultze, C. (1975). Pollution, Prices, and Public Policy. Brookings Institution,
Washington, DC.
Kolstad, C. (2000). Environmental Economics. New York, Oxford University Press.
Milliman, S.R., & Prince, R. (1989). Firm incentives to promote technological change in pollution
control. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 17, 247-265.
Montero, J.-P. (2002). Permits, standards, and technology innovation. Journal of Environmental
Economics and Management, 44, 23-44.
Poyago-Theotoky, J.A. (2007). The organization of R&D and environmental policy. Journal of
Economic Behavior and Organization, 62, 63-75.
Puller, S.L. (2006). The strategic use of innovation to influence regulatory standards. Journal of
Environmental Economics and Management, 52, 690-706.
Rauscher, M. (1997). International Trade, Factor Movements, and the Environment. Oxford:
Clarendon Press.
Requate, T. (2005a). Commitment and timing of environmental policy, adoption of new technol-
ogy, and repercussions on R&D. Environmental and Resource Economics, 31, 175-199.
Requate, T. (2005b). Dynamic incentives by environmental policy instruments – A Survey. Eco-
logical Economics, 54, 175-195.
Requate, T., & Unold, W. (2003). Environmental policy incentives to adopt advanced abatement
technology: Will the true ranking please stand up? European Economic Review, 47, 125-146.
Stern, N. (2007). The Economics of Climate Change: The Stern Review. Cambridge and New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Tarui, N., & Polasky, S. (2005). Environmental regulation with technology adoption, learning and
strategic behavior. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 50, 447-467.
Ulph, A. (1996). Environmental policy and international trade when governments and producers
act strategically. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 30, 265-281.
20
Ulph, D. (1998). Environmental policy and technological innovation. in Frontiers of Environmen-
tal Economics (Carraro, C., & Siniscalaco, D., Ed.), Cheltenhsam, Edward Elgar.
Ulph, A., & Ulph, D. (2007). Climate change – Environmental and technology policies in a strate-
gic context. Environmental and Resource Economics, 37, 159-180.
21
